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begin with, it is necessary to explain the terms "traditional" and "innovative" 
context of this paper. raditional," at least this essay, does not imply outdated; 
does necessarily imply "better" some qualitative sense. fact, it is 
often true that some "innovative" ideas are really traditionally held ones revamped 
for a contemporary audience. 50, for the purposes of this paper, will speak of the 
"traditional" elements of Wesley's anthropology as those which tend to echo the 
approaches of his day. These approaches, as will note below, are often those held 
by Evangelicals the past 300 years as "traditional" anthropological conclusions.] 
innovative mean recent approaches to anthropoIogy which have empha-
sized a more approach to anthropology and have called into question the 
dichotomy and trichotomy so prevaIent many Evangelical anthropoIogies? The 
difficulty assessing Wesle/s anthropology comes from the fact that Wesley wrote 
comparatively little the issue of the "constituent elements" of human anthropolo-
gy, seeking to concentrate much of his work other matters pertaining to the 
image of God, salvation, sanctification, and the like. this paper [ argue that the ser-
mons and writings of Wesley that do either directly indirectly pertain to anthro-
pology, although more dualistic nature (reflecting the "traditional" position and 
therefore mirroring much of the anthropology of his day), do not directly define 
Wesley's approach to ministering to human beings either individually collectively, 
From this, seek to cast a vision for theology and ministry that is directly 
connected to a more holistic (and more systematic) anthropology. 
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11. JOHN WESLEY'S ANTHROPOLOGY: OVERVIEW 
As Randy Maddox notes regard to Wesley's anthropology: basic anthropologi-
cal convictions sought to emulate the holism of biblical teachings."J This is the case for 
Wesley spite of the fact that many of Wesley's direct teachings are (ontologically speak-
ing) dualistic. For example, as Maddox observes, his evaluation of "bodiliness" was not 
always positive, and his view of the separateness of body and soul became more pro-
nounced his teachings, especially his later years.4 
the one hand, Wesley seems to see a strong dichotomy expressed the New 
Testament (cf., his comments Thess. 5:23), but the other hand he at times attrib-
utes terms "tlesh" and as different aspects of the whole person (cf., his com-
ments Gal. 6:8) .5 It seems that Maddox, others, notes the incongruities at times 
present Wesley's anthropology. It is at once a product of the dualism of Wesley's day (a 
time of dualism and, more immediately Wesley's day, Cartesian dualism, 
etc1 At the same time, practical outworkings of his anthropology, a holistic approach 
to the human being surfaces, the relational corporate aspects of his 
anthropology. It is here that the innovativeness of Wesley's practice outstrips the rather 
"traditional" dualistic approach he takes his formally stated anthropology. 
assessing the holistic elements of Wesley's anthropology, one encounters frustration 
at times, since Wesley's approach to anthropology is less a product of "systematic theolo-
gy" as it is an attempt at philosophical theology. Furthermore, at times Wesley seems to 
separate his holistic practice from his dualistic teachings the subject. observe this 
tension, it would be helpful to outline Wesley's statements anthropology and then 
observe his basic anthropological as expressed the practical outworkings of 
his anthropology. 
WESLEY'S TECHNICAL DUALISM 
First of all, it is noteworthy that teachings of Wesley regarding anthropology 
express a great deal of the body/soul dualism of his day. Wesley's sermon entitled, 
"What is Man," he states that there exists something human beings beside the body: 
"But beside this strange compound of the four elements, - earth, water, air, and -
something me of a quite different nature, nothing akin to any of these."6 This other 
"part" of the human being is what Wesley calls the "soul."7 Wesley locates the of 
human existence this part called the "soul": "But what am J? Unquestionably am 
something distinct from my body."8 
This part called the "soul" by Wesley is what constitutes the of the human 
being after the "body' dies. He holds out the hope that the soul will even though the 
body dies. Although, undoubtedly owing to Paul' s discussion of resurrection terms of 
50ma Cor. 15,9 Wesley does not opt for a non-corporeal resurrection, stating that the 
body-soul unity of the human being will be restored at the resurrection : my present 
state of existence, undoubtedly consist of both soul and body: And so shall again, after 
the resurrection, to all etemity."10 
Wesley expounds this view, citing it as an explanation of the parable of /esus 
conceming the rich man and Lazarus Luke 6, where he describes paradise as " ... the 
antechamber of heaven, where the souls of the righteous remain till, after the general 
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judgement, they are received into gI0ry."] ] Simi1ar1y, Hades the parab1e of the man 
and Lazarus (at least the part of Hades from where the man out) is as 
.where the souls of wicked men reside. "]2 Death is therefore expressed 
dichotomistic terms: ''Death is proper1y, says Wes1ey, "the separation of the soul from the 
body."]3 However, Wesley sees the of the "body" as essential to the 
faith, stating that the same body and sou1 possessed before the be the 
possession of the human being for etemity. ]4 
summary, then, Wes1ey's anthropo1ogica1 dua1ism is exhibited the following char-
First, it does speak of a rea1 distinction between that which is called the body 
and the soul. Secondly, Wes1ey identifies the of the human being as bound the 
concept of a separate1y existing "sou1," seeing the sou1 as the "essentia1 se1f." the 
''othemess'' of the sou1 is an important factor Wes1ey's exp1anation of concepts such as 
death and the intermediate state (j .e., the Luke 16 parable). For Wesley, at death the soul 
temporarily separates from the body, existing a (conscious) state of waiting for the res-
when the body and sou1 are reunited. 
WESLEY'S DICHOTOMY HIs MINISTRY 
Although a dichotomist the technical sense, Wesley's approach to to 
human beings takes many ho1istic elements. His "holism' may be most clearly seen 
his concem for both physical and aspects of the human being.]5 More c1early, 
especially light of recent to anthropological duaIism (discussed beIow), one 
may the social concems of WesIey's preaching and as evidence of a 
functional hoIism at work WesIey's approach to ministry. Furthermore, Wesley's asser-
tions regarding the dignity and equality of the whole person distances his onto1ogicaI duaI-
ism from recent critiques of duaIism by those who rightly point out the dangers of 
dichotomy and this regard.]6 
CONCERN AS HOLlSTlC EXPRESSION 
First we may see WesIey's social concem as an expression of his functional anthropo-
logica1 hoIism. Despite some of WesIey's individuaIistic concems (e.g., sa1vation and per-
fection of the individuat) ]7, WesIey at times clearly identifies the parameters of 
as involving the whole person, including physical, and social aspects. One need 
to read Wesley's take Jesus's words the Sermon the Mount recorded 
Matt. 5: 13-16. is essentially a social Wesley, 'and . . to tum it 
into a soIitary religion, is indeed to destroy According to Wesley, many of those char-
which are to define the human being his/ her Iife - patience, meek-
ness, gentleness, and - have place under heaven, without an inter-
course with other men."]9 These statements echo what Wesleyan theologian Mi1dred 
Bangs Wynkoop as essential understanding biblical anthropology 
general. Human beings are "corporate" nature that they find meaning social reIat-
edness, not "static beingness."20 This understanding of the human being also comes to 
the fore Wes1ey's understanding of the imago dei relational rather than onto-
logica1 terms,z] The individuation, then, that Wesley denotes the concept of "soul," does 
not lead him to an overly individua1istic anthropo1ogy. 
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The saving of "souls" emphasis is indeed a strong one Wesley's thought; however, 
Wesley's anthropology and holistic approach to the human being the realm 
of the social (the "corporate," relational nature of the human being) helps keep Wesley's 
anthropology from leading him into the myopic approach employed by many 
of his theological progeny, for whom "saving souls" is often emphasized at the exclusion 
of broader social concern,22 
2. WESLEY, DIGNITY, EQUALITY 
While notable twentieth-century theologians, especially those with Liberation 
thought, have cited the dangers of anthropological dualism regard to the dignity of 
human beings, W esley' s holistic approach the 700s would be nearly above reproach, 
despite some of his straying into anthropological dualism (dichotomy), Anyone familiar 
with Wesley's strong opposition to slavery, his arguments for the dignity of the poor, and 
his encouragement of women every aspect of ministry, would have trouble with 
the speculation that he would agree with the assertion of Gustavo Gutierrez that the "spir-
itual pursuits" of the poor "do not eliminate their physical hunger, and we must keep both 
dimensions before US."23 
The holistic of /ohn Wesley's anthropology shines forth the sense that he did 
not allow his speculations regarding the ontological distinction between physical and 
tual (e.g., body and sou\) to produce an intellectual racial bigotry that has at times 
emerged from both Platonic and non-Platonic expressions of anthropological dualism 
the history of For Wesley, then, the dignity of the human being does not 
simply one's possession of a "soul," does it one's attainment of things more 
"spiritual" and less "physical" mundane. Rather, for Wesley, the dignity of human 
beings their capacity to be as an expression of Cod' s us, He states, 
"The slave is the brother of the slave owner trader and should be respected as SUCh,"25 
put it another way, as does Dunning, "When God set out to redeem and restore his 
fallen creation he intended to renew people' s relations not only to him but also to each 
other,"26 That which impedes human dignity, then, impedes the full display of the grace 
and of God God' s creatures, 
C. SUMMARY 
concerns of those who have been critical of anthropological dualism are the 
neglect of (to Wynkoop's terminology) the social "relatedness" of human 
beings (i ,e" the areas of social elements of and the ideals of human dignity) 
favor of individual "beingness," This neglect has occurred when, regard to anthropol-
ogy for example, we the words of /usto Gonzalez) ask the wrong question of the texts 
of Scripture, since the concem of the biblical authors seems much more to be regard to 
the whole person relationship to God and others rather than "parts" orcomposites" 
the human being relation to each other.27 This can easily occur when dichotomistic 
anthropologies, even those that are non-Platonic nature, are consistently explicated, 
For Wesley, however, his dichotomistic teachings concerning the nature of human 
beings did not cause him fall into the ditches of social neglect ontological hierarchies 
prevalent much of the dualistic thought and practice of his Evangelical progeny, At the 
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same time, Wesley's holistic approach maintained a clear undertone of orthodoxy 
regard to matters such as sin, salvation by grace, and His approach 
to human beings, while "traditional" conception, appears rather innovative practice 
as One assesses the recent trends anthropology. 
DUALlSM EVANGELlCALlSM SINCE WESLEY 
Much of EvangeIicaIism, indeed much of has held to some form of onto-
logical dualism regard to the human being. Ancient debates regarding the human being 
as composed of a body and an "immortal soul," the words of ertullian, the soul as 
., essential self' s view, continued to the theologicaI Iandscape the time of 
Wesley and beyond.28 Indeed, according to Berkhof, by studying how system-
atic theologies have poured meaning into the creation and composition of the human 
being, one could write a piece of Europe's cultural history!29 
As the twentieth century approached, a great deal of discussion emerged as to the 
meaning of anthropologica! terms the Old and New estament that were normally 
translated into EngIish as "soul," "heart," "f1esh," and "body."JO Evangelicals, such as 
Wheeler Robinson (a Baptist),1' along with non-Evangelicals such as Rudolf Bultmann,12 
john Robinson,1J and Karl BarthJ4 began to question the dichotomy and 
debates so prevalent biblical anthropology by another solution. This solution 
was not simply monism, which asserts that the human being is only physical. 
Rather, through either etymological analysis (e.g., Bultmann) through a combination of 
etymological and cultural analysis (e.g., Hebrew/Greek contrasts, as W. Robinson's 
work), there arose a more holistic conception of the human being as a being consisting of 
more than simply physical attributes, yet essentially a whole. Although these 
seemed like "innovations" the of biblical anthropology, these authors argued 
that they were simply rescuing "traditional" anthropology from those who had, through 
the centuries, disfigured biblica! anthropology with ground Athens," 
Hellenistic anthropology subsumed into biblical interpretation.J5 The anthropological 
terms of the Old and New estaments were seen as of aspects of the 
human being rather than as a philosophical of separately existing "parts." 
Despite the voices of EvangelicalsJ6 who have come to oppose dichotomy 
my as an adequate biblical paradigm, there has recently emerged fresh new "defenses" of 
dualism from among the ranks of Evangelicals, even Wesleyans. john W. Cooper's 
defense of a form of Thomistic dualism is now enjoying a second due to 
the of a work by j. Moreland and Scott Rae that commends and defends 
Cooper s dualism and takes it a step further by applying it to ethics.37 Thomas Oden, a 
Wesleyan (Methodist), asserts dualism as with teaching and biblical doc-
These recent defenses of dualism (dichotomy) have taken greater care than most 
earlier expressions of dualism to, of all, distance this brand of duaIism 
from Platonic views which degrade the physical. Secondly, as Wesley did, this 
view asserts the of the body" as essential As a further 
expansion of this, these Evangelical dualists assert their main reasons for a dualistic concep-
tion of the human being is, their view, the "clear bibIicaI teaching" of the possibiIity of the 
"soul" to survive apart from the body at death.J9 These Evangelical apologists for dualism 
144 Christian 
are often quick to point out that this partitive conception of the intermediate state, 
however blissful, is incomplete, since wholeness requires a -reuniting of soul and 
body."40 However, most Evangelical conceptions such as those just described are careful 
also to distance themselves from the Hellenistic (Platonic) concept of the innate immor-
tality of the soul.' I 
Despite these attempts to distance dichotomy (or trichotomy) from the Platonic over-
tones of the past, three areas where a more dualistic anthropology has drawn criticism, 
both from inside and outside of Evangelicalism, has been regard to the holistic nature 
of salvation, the dignity and equality of all human beings, and dealing with death and the 
intermediate state. The consistent critique handed down to this renewed form of dual-
ism can be summed the words of Gonzalez: ''Here again, ... what has been done 
is to pose ontological terms what the Bible poses a different manner."42 
SAL V AS HOLISTlC 
For much of Evangelicalism since Wesley, savings "souls" has been a clarion call. Ray 
Anderson reminds that the Greek word soteria "can mean either salvation [physicalJ 
healing, and often, it iS only the context that reveals which particular meaning the biblical 
author intended."43 However, the early part of the twentieth century and beyond, the 
inherent dangers of dichotomistic anthropology were brought to bear, causing an 
"either/or" mentality to arise the minds of Evangelicals (either be about the business of 
"saving souls" of "feeding the bodies"). Added to this was the work of the Social 
Gospel movement of Rauschenbusch and others him who emphasized the need for 
doing good tangibly. light of Evangelicalism's emphasis "saving souls" and spiritual 
transformation over and above meeting physical needs, Rauschenbusch asks: the 
atrocities of the Congo cease if we merely radiate goodness from regenerate SOUIS?,,44 
response, debates raged for decades between EvangelicaIs and those the Social 
Gospel Movement regarding the pendulum swing of neglect of the "spirituaI" matters 
such as repentance favor of meeting physical needs.'s The result became that the 
emphasis salvific concem for the whole person and indeed for all of creation (cf., 
Rom. 8:20-25) became an often neglected biblical theme. And debates at times caused 
many of those who would assert ties to Wesley's thought to become and indi-
viduaIIy focused their approach to ministering to human beings46 
Although a dichotomist a technical sense, Wesley's approach to salvation includes 
broader social concerns, allowing both Social Gospel proponents and conservative 
Evangelicals to claim legitimate birthrights from the ministry of Wesley. However, these 
groups who claim at least Wesley's influence (or even direct lineage) have often gone to 
extremes: either failing to properly address the "spiritual" aspects of human need (Social 
Gospe\), emphasizing the "spiritual" a manner that eclipses the plight of human beings 
desperate need (Evangelicalism, including branches of conservative Wesleyanism). 
DUAUSM AS THREAT HUMAN DIGNlTY EQUALITY 
further critique of dichotomistic approaches is the tendency of dichotomy (or tri-
chotomy) to assail the dignity and equality of human beings. This may prove shocking to 
some light of the fact that the concept of "soul" is often used to justify the dignity of 
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human beings (e.g., direct creationism of the sou\ arguments Roman CathoIic and 
Protestant pro-life defenses) . However, the cost of arguing for a duaIistic conception of 
·'souI" for many (especialJy the twentieth century) has come at too a 
As Justo Gonzalez (a Methodist historian and theoIogian) notes: ' .the common 
understanding of the human being as consisting of two (or three) parts is not a sociopo-
neutral notion."47 This of duaIism has at times oppression. exam-
pIe of this is seen the elevation of those who pursue inteIlectual matters over those 
involved manuaI labor (which is a more ·'earthy'· ··physicaI," and consequently 
more pursuit).48 Catholic Liberation theologian Jose CombIin echoes these senti-
ments, citing that with the rise of duaIism the ancient Church, "soul" activities 
such as thinking and contemplation, were treated as superior to other activities. 
Therefore, "inteIlectual activity was divorced from bodiIy, manuaI activity,'· so that manu-
aI labor was seen as "inferior to contemplation."49 
AIthough Wesley held a high view of human dignity and equaIity, these views came 
the context of his dualistic anthropology. Recent attempts at developing a 
anthropology have addressed the need for a consistent bibIicaI ministry to the whole 
person f10wing from a stated hoIistic anthropology.50 Wesley's approach tended to sepa-
rate theoretical and speculative elements of his duaIistic theology from his hoIistic 
approach to ministry this sense, meaning that his dichotomy did not seem to his 
focus away from the biblicaI paradigm of the dignity and equality of aIl human beings 
who were created God' s image. 
C. DUALISM'S LAST INTERMEDIATE STATE 
area of interest regard to Wesley's approach to ministry is regard to death 
and resurrection. These concepts are tied to one' 5 anthropology. This is particu-
IarIy true many recent EvangelicaI defenses of which seem to 
begin with a defense of a conscious partitive existence after death and then proceed 
toward building a anthropoIogy. WesIey began with philosophicaI assertions 
about anthropoIogy and then them into his views of the intermediate state (as 
comments Luke 6). However, much of recent EvangeIical defenses of dichotomy 
begin with the assertion that survival of the human being's "souI" at death apart from the 
"body'· is a biblical "fact." Therefore, one must posit anthropological dualism order to 
satisfy this paradigm.51 
many, however, this seems to put the theological cart before the horse. lt wouId 
seem preferabIe to begin with an attempt at an adequate assessment of anthropological 
terms and concepts to determine whether not they seem dualistic. From there, one 
could then interpret the more eschatological passages (especiaIly those pertaining 
to personal eschatology, such as 2 Cor. 5, etc.} this light. reversing this process, pro-
ponents of duaIism open themselves to criticism of poor exegesis. And, a very 
practical level, they the error pointed out by Barth his in resur-
rection does not replace death, rather it foIlows death <of the believer) .52 Likewise, it 
would seem correct to assert that the "soul" Iiving apart from the body seems to nullify 
the concept of resurrection, which is a key paradigm New estament theology. 
46 Christian 
IV. WESLEY ANTHROPOLOCY FOR 2 ST CENTURY 
It is remarkabIe that we are still taIking about aspects of the theology and ministry of a 
man who was born three hundred years ago. This is IargeIy due to the fact that he was 
such an ardent foIlower of a man who Iived two thousand years ago. This second man, 
Jesus his Iife and work, is the true focus of theology. Anthropology is sec-
ondary. However, as Kevin Vanhoozer states, Iight of the incamation ... humanity is a 
theme of theology, not spite of, but bemuse God is the theme of theoIogy."53 It wouId 
seem, then, that any relevant expression of WesIeyan theology needs to move into the 
century with a hoIistic approach that the hoIistic concem of Wesley, 
and more importantly, the concem of Jesus. The ministry of Jesus demonstrates concern 
beyond the "salvation of souIs" and into an ethic of social concem and 
This is seen the very uses of the soteria the New estament (e.g., Acts 4 :9- 2). 
Also noteworthy is the Messianic promise of 15. 35:5-6, which the Messiah's ministry is 
marked by physical as weII as "Then will the eyes of the blind be 
opened and the ears of the deaf unstopped. . . .' 
The centuries since Wesley's innovative holistic practices his approach to human 
beings have brought about a purging of some traditionaIly held dichotomistic views of 
human nature by those who read anthropological terms as attempts at philosophical 
ontology, rather than (properly) as relational expressions of the dignity of the human 
being relation to God and one another. The struggle that we as recent of 
Wesley's anthropology face is the dilemma of his theoretical anthropology, 
by a type of dualism, did produce the myopic practice that much of his feIlow 
dichotomists produced foIlowing generations. a real sense, Wesley practiced his 
very biblicaIIy holistic anthropology with ''one hand tied behind his back:" his 
tion of anthropological terms was more colored by the strong dualistic voices of his day 
than by thorough exegesis. matter, though, since the end, the innovativeness of his 
practice set the stage for a truly "social" Christianity (to use Wesley's words) that can 
now be strengthened by untying the hand of sound biblical exegesis regard the 
human being as seen the relational terms (soul, spirit, heart, mind, body, etc.) 
used the biblical texts. 54 
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